

## Depiction Pursued

### Five Issues

This chapter looks at how the proposed theory of depiction handles more elaborate kinds of pictures and at the issues raised by other theories. First and foremost there is the issue of depth, and the controversy surrounding systems of projection and perspective. A second and related kind of picture is the distortion derived from an unusual lens, such as an anamorphic lens, which perhaps raises the question whether a surface's two-dimensional markings can adequately explain our recognition of such pictures. The third issue concerns caricature, which resembles its object paradoxically, by exaggerating features and relations. A fourth and surprisingly similar issue is that of fiction, and whether a depiction of a fictional entity such as a unicorn or Homer Simpson, can truly be said to resemble their objects? (When there truly are no objects for them to resemble). Finally there are those depictions found in an idle gaze at stains on a wall or in the shapes of foliage or clouds, and whether these are truly surfaces, adequately exemplified as two-dimensionality?


#### 1. Depth

So far we have looked at how two dimensions can be exemplified and depict one side or aspect of an object, and build a basic picture plane. Having established this basic two-dimensionality or picture plane, further developments are essentially concerned with how to accommodate more than one side of an object upon this plane, or conversely, construct two-dimensionality at more remote and sophisticated angles to the object. The move is ultimately to accommodate depth, or three-dimensionality; to map features not only in terms of up and down, left and right but back and forward. But where two dimensions are contained in three and

may be detected and displayed accordingly, three dimensions obviously do not 'go into' two. Depth must be treated differently.

John Willats has demonstrated how much of this development, both in children's pictures, and in the history of art, echoes the aims and methods of various schemes of descriptive geometry, and its elementary projections of orthogonal, oblique, and parallel oblique schemes, and various perspectives.<sup>42</sup> Willats rightly stresses the folly of seeing a 'recapitulation' or an evolutionary agenda in the comparison between children's pictorial competence and various stages of art history, and instead points to the distinct uses for various projections and perspectives, and the shifting requirements made of pictures throughout art history.

But before discussing kinds of depth, some elementary distinctions between projections and perspectives should be noted (Figure B). The basic pictures so far



<sup>42</sup> John Willats, *Art and Representation: New Principles in the Analysis of Pictures*, Princeton, N.J. 1997. *Figure B* is owed to this publication.

diagonal, or oblique angle to one or more adjoining sides, as distinct from simply a diagonal shape to a side, and now serves as basically a third axis, in between the vertical and horizontal axes of the picture plane. Again, this is a view available to long lens photography and something easily found in non-pictorial or plain perception. Parallel oblique projections thus register depth at an ascending angle for objects, while vertical or horizontal planes contained, remain constant in size or length to the picture plane.

Perspective supplies one or more vanishing points, according to a notional or not necessarily included, horizon. The difference between parallel oblique projections and perspectives is rather like the difference in photography between using long and wide lenses, for close and distant objects. In fact the wider the lens, the more vanishing points a scheme introduces, a very wide lens gives a 'fisheye' depiction, with vanishing points at every point on the perimeter of the necessarily circular picture plane. Yet we can still make sense of the picture, we can still 'see' in this way, even if it seems uncomfortable or unnatural. The issue of artifice and nature is returned to shortly. Here a little more of Willat's position needs to be appreciated.

While Willats is anxious to emphasise the varying uses for these schemes of depth and to some extent their co-existence, nevertheless his view of the development of pictorial depth, still places perspectives as the goal to which a picture 'faithful' to the principles of visual perception aspires. In this he adheres to the tradition that draws upon the work of the psychology of visual perception, particularly the work of J. J. Gibson, R. L. Gregory, Gregory's collaborations with Gombrich, and the fieldwork of John M. Kennedy.<sup>43</sup> It is a view of perception that rests upon an optical stimulus, or information transmitted by the rays of light, reflected from an object to the viewer, which then allows the viewer to perceive the object. In the case of depiction, the rays of light are called upon to carry two lots of information, firstly about the picture surface, and secondly about the object depicted. Gibson characterises this information as 'invariants' that separate out the distance, surfaces and contours of an object, from accidental effects of time or motion, for example. Yet Gibson's behavioural or evolutionist bias leads him to look for invariants on

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<sup>43</sup>James J Gibson, *The Perception Of The Visual World*, Boston, 1950, R. L. Gregory, *The Intelligent Eye*, London, 1970, E.H Gombrich and R.L. Gregory, *Illusion in Art and Nature*, London, 1973, John M. Kennedy, *The Psychology Of Picture Perception*, San Francisco, 1974.

only the crudest of 'environmental' bases, so that two-dimensionality for example, eludes him. Willats thus inherits a view of depiction as exchanging rules or conventions for depth with a more vivid experience or illusion, in keeping with a plain or natural perception.

Yet as shown, we see depth in any number ways and for any number of reasons. Not only are such ways familiar to the conventions of photography as well as drawing, but to our plain or non-pictorial experience. The eye's lens, like a camera's lenses, is variable, and if it has an invariant it is variation. The appeal to a native perception guided only by principles of surfaces, contours, occluding lines, planes and so forth, is no more than a behaviourist's makeover for the innocent eye, and in denial of a more than visual mind. To quote Goodman (ironically, in support of Gombrich):

The eye comes always ancient to its work, obsessed by its own past, and by old and new insinuations of the ear, nose, tongue, fingers heart and brain. It functions not as an instrument self-empowered and alone, but as a dutiful member of a complex and capricious organism. Not only how but what it sees is regulated by need and prejudice. It selects, rejects, organizes, discriminates, associates, classifies, analyses, constructs.<sup>44</sup>

Goodman's firm rejection of Gibson and Gombrich's view of perspective and the perception of depth fuelled a long-standing controversy between theorists deriving their views from principles of optics, and those deriving their views from symbol systems such as Erwin Panofsky or Meyer Schapiro, and opposing schools of psychology such as Arnheim, and Goodman, who combines both.<sup>45</sup> The argument is essentially over whether perception is natural or conventional, inherent or learned. In the earlier exchange noted between Gombrich and Goodman they find common ground in the acceptance that some conventions allow for others, or that conventions are built upon conventions, and therefore some seem comparatively natural, others artificial. But Goodman then asked where do we draw the line? And is it important?<sup>46</sup> Pursuing the most natural is a path of infinite regress.

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<sup>44</sup> Goodman, 1976, pp. 7-8.

<sup>45</sup> See for example the exchange in articles by Goodman, Gibson and Gombrich in *Leonardo*, 1971, No 4. See also Panofsky, 'Die Perspektive als symbolische Form' in *Aufsätze*, 1927, pp. 99-167. Schapiro, *Modern Art: 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*, New York, 1978, pp. 185-211, Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception* Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1954.

<sup>46</sup> Gombrich, 1982, p. 284.

Clearly Willats was unimpressed by such relativism. Yet the problem cannot be ignored, and ultimately undermines much of his findings. For example, concerning the chapter on optical denotations where he claims ‘very few artists have, in fact, attempted to replicate the appearance of the optic array directly’ - there is a disturbing lack of awareness of the sheer futility of the suggestion.<sup>47</sup> Not only is there no way to replicate light with paint ‘directly’, but ‘the appearance’ of the optic array surely depends upon what is being looked for, and how, in Gombrich’s terms, what can be matched depends upon what can be made. The extensive studies by Gombrich concerning just this question, and concluding with just this answer, seem to have been lost on Willats, all the more curious since Gombrich is a much cited source as well as something of a mentor.<sup>48</sup> Similarly, summary of Seurat’s approach to painting as ‘an *artificial* pictorial effect that refers to the effects of light but does not *replicate them directly*’ (my italics) commits him to the twin follies of a belief in pictorial effects that are not ‘artificial’, and a belief that light might somehow be substituted with paint.<sup>49</sup>

Turning to the matter of depicting several related objects and to options available to projections and perspectives, the picture plane may firstly accommodate more than one object by extending laterally or vertically. In the case of the ancient Egyptians, lateral extension also introduces a reduced directionality to the picture, and a tentative step toward writing. Two-dimensional mapping or ‘topological’ relations as Willats terms them, also result in the ‘fold-out’ picture, identified by A. L. Nicholls and J. M. Kennedy in the work of young children, and by Willats in icons of the Byzantine and Orthodox churches.<sup>50</sup> Here, adjacent objects in a scene may be depicted from conflicting aspects – a house seen from in front, a field seen from above, but sharing an edge as an of axis upon which one might ‘fold’ the picture to create a three dimensional model.

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<sup>47</sup> Willats, 1997, p. 133.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. xii. See also Gombrich, 1960, pp. 313-314, ‘For if we have learned anything in the course of these chapters it is that representation is never a replica. The forms of art, ancient and modern, are not duplications of what the artist has in mind any more than they are duplications of what he sees in the outer world’.

<sup>49</sup> Willats, 1997, p. 145.

<sup>50</sup> Nicholls and Kennedy, ‘Drawing development from similarity of features to direction’ in *Child Development*: 63, 1992, pp. 227-241. Willats, 1997, pp. 194-199.

The fold-out picture may also be seen as a kind of collage or made up of a series of smaller pictures, each of a single object, and related to one other so that each shares a common axis and dimension, while their second, conflicting axis – it need not run at 90 degrees, need not be readily ‘foldable’ - constructs divergent versions of the picture plane. Depth or a third dimension here is understood in just these terms: as simply a realignment of each object/picture plane’s axes. Various kinds of multiple pictures arise, combining various projections and even perspectives, and some of these are dealt with as anomalies and some as plain ineptitude by Willats. The tradition of Persian and Indian miniatures offers many examples of depth and scale jumps that are often reminiscent of modern photo-collages, and while the use to which such a technique may be put is clear, predictably Willats concludes:

Thus, although individual parts of the scene look strongly three-dimensional, the eye cannot make sense of the space of the scene as a whole, and this destroys the illusion of a real three-dimensional scene and flattens the picture.<sup>51</sup>

Tactfully, one might reply that it depends on which mind the eye serves. More constructively, one might suggest that more than one look, or more than one perspective are also properties of vision, that we do not necessarily look only in one direction, or on one focal length, or from one position, in viewing a scene, let alone a picture.

Beyond the foldout or multiple pictures, there is the development of more integrated approaches to depth. The picture plane, while initially aligned with a single side of an object, introduces additional and unaligned sides (or parallel oblique projections) These are the elementary projections that emphasise one corner of an object – and promptly confound Gombrich’s famous axiom for the development of perspective, namely that it ‘rests on a simple and incontrovertible fact of experience, the fact that we cannot look around a corner’.<sup>52</sup> Projections progress to the alignment of axis or connecting edge of two adjacent sides, leaving both or more unaligned, and hence understood as receding in depth from the aligned edge. These are the isometric, diametric and trimetric oblique projections illustrated in Figure B. In each case the picture plane is gradually separated or

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<sup>51</sup> Willats, 1997, p. 228.

<sup>52</sup> Gombrich, 1960, p. 250.

distanced from a direct alignment with the object and becomes instead a ‘slice’ across a three-dimensional space or the traditionally understood ‘window’ frame before the object. In this there is general agreement with the findings of David Marr and associates, of a development from object-centred descriptions to view or scene-centred descriptions.<sup>53</sup>

The achievement of perspective, in this view, is precisely the realisation that a two-dimensional plane may be constructed anywhere within a three dimensional space, and that it need not align itself wholly or solely with solid objects, but instead locate itself in relation to an horizon and one or more vanishing points. It is this flexibility, rather than its illusionary properties, that play an important role in the dominance of perspective as a pictorial tradition. Vanishing points allow depth to be understood, not in terms of any one oblique plane or angle, but as all planes or edges aligned to a vanishing point and the picture plane. It allows for a greater integration of objects, in a number of interesting ways, but the point here is simply that horizon and vanishing points provide further means of constructing three dimensions from two.

## 2. Distortion

An argument made against a two-dimensional view of the picture surface, and in favour of an optical view of perception, concerns the recognition of distorted images, such as an anamorphic image, that can only be viewed correctly when the viewer stands to the side of the picture surface rather than in front of it. Kennedy claims that such depictions support the view that it is the optical information supplied by the surface, or the light rays reflected from it, that enable the perception of a depiction, rather than the surface ‘itself’, or the surface unviewed, or perhaps the surface understood as various markings viewed only from in front of the picture surface, and presumably in a ‘light-free’ environment.<sup>54</sup>

Taking the example of a photographic plate, he argues that it is the chemical’s structure rather than the chemical’s distribution on the picture surface that directs

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<sup>53</sup> Marr, ‘Representing visual information: a computational approach,’ in *Computer Vision*, A. R. Hanson and E. M. Riseman (eds.) New York, 1978, pp. 61-80 and Marr, *Vision: A Computational Investigation into the Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information*, San Francisco, 1982.

<sup>54</sup> Kennedy, 1974, p.36.

the light. But since the chemical's distribution is surely part of its structure, this distinction too fails to isolate the picture surface from the light reflected from it. 'Any theory that relies on descriptions of elements and their distribution on a surface is inconvenienced by anamorphics' he concludes, but no more inconvenienced than the viewer, of either the surface or its light isolated from each other.<sup>55</sup> The argument fails because it assumes the surface is to be described from only one angle - in front - while its light allows another option. But the description of the surface *is* the description of its reflected light. We view an anamorphic picture with light, whether we stand in front or to the side of a picture, only one view easily supplies us with a picture, but this viewing condition supplies us with the 'informative light' only because it issues from an 'informative' surface, or the surface rightly taken, or so sampled.

### 3. Caricature

The issue of caricature poses problems for a theory of depiction in as much it allows deliberate exaggeration or distortion of an object for comic effect, while still preserving the object's resemblance and identity. On the one hand we readily recognise the object, while on the other we are aware that it does not 'really' look this way. Apart from the surprise and humour that results, the issue draws forth several deeper questions concerning the resemblance we hold for an object, the expressive, and accidental qualities we allow it, the means by which these are brought about in depiction.

Gombrich and Wollheim make important contributions to the issue and Willats has also made some interesting suggestions concerning topological functions for caricature.<sup>56</sup> But here attention remains on certain converging interests of Gombrich and Wollheim.<sup>57</sup> Gombrich's treatment covers a broader range of caricature, dealing with both the caricature of certain persons as well as the whimsical creations of Walt Disney or James Thurber. He points firstly to the wholistic and complex nature of perceived likenesses in portraits, and faces in general, and to the difficulty of settling on a characteristic expression for an

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<sup>55</sup> Kennedy, 1974, p.36.

<sup>56</sup> Willats, 1997, p. 72.

<sup>57</sup> Gombrich, 1960, pp. 279-303. Wollheim, 1987, pp. 69-70.

individual, as well as a characteristic expression for general states of mind, such as happiness or despair (which can often look alike). For Gombrich this process amplifies his view of pictorial development, as one of schema and correction. A schema is a traditional means or format that is tested with some new aim or task, and if successful, is 'corrected' to include this aim, or is recognised as a new, in this case, funnier version of the tradition. With caricature the correction occurs not by trying to observe some new or different part of an object, but rather by deconstructing or toying with the means, and then testing to see if it still matches or resembles the object. For Gombrich the humorous side of this is bound up with dark psychological taboos concerning unconscious hostilities toward the object. But humour apart, this model also suggests the uneasy relation between expression and representation, between shifting properties attributed to an object, and their impact upon its identity.

For the moment it is enough to indicate how this issue leads directly to that of expression. Expression is addressed in the following essay. Wollheim's contribution finds its clearest account in *Painting as an Art*.<sup>58</sup> His view is bound up in a discussion of the kinds of things that can be painted and depicted generally. His categories for depictive content take the form of a cross-classification that runs along one axis from objects to events, and along the other from particulars to kinds. A particular object such as the portrait of *Madame Moitessier* by J. A. D. Ingres, is made up of kinds of particulars, so to speak, such as a portrait of a woman, a young person, a French citizen, born in the early nineteenth century, middle class, self-assured, and so on. One constructs the individual according to which kinds one knows and sees them belonging to - except in the case of caricatures - where a person may be depicted as belonging to an impossible kind, such as an animal or, in the example used by both Wollheim and Gombrich, the French emperor Louis Phillippe turning into a pear in *Les Poires* by Phillipon.

The idea of caricature as a misclassing has parallels with Gombrich's model of schema and correction and the experimental or testing nature of depiction, although Wollheim does not pursue its application outside of persons, to a dog in a Thurber or Disney cartoon, for example. What is important about Wollheim's formulation is

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<sup>58</sup> Wollheim, 1987, pp. 69-71.

its location within the categories outlined. Caricatures play with the misuse of kinds, but more earnest depiction relies upon the same ladders of kinds, rendering an object in degree of particularity. The difference between seeing a picture of a young woman and just seeing a young woman for example, is taken to lie in the greater particularity of the direct perception.<sup>59</sup> Yet the danger lies in offering an example purely by description, or without illustration, for the young woman hypothetically pictured, is surely located after a fashion, perhaps even to a time of day, and even when we do not learn the name and history of the young woman from the picture (a situation that may equally apply to direct perception), pictures of young women come in many kinds, from the formal portraits by Ingres, to the Madonnas of Raphael, the ballet students of Degas, the sun bathers of Renoir, and the housewives of Vermeer, for example. The particular proliferates in pictures as vigorously as in direct perception. Then again, while kinds are as common to pictures as to direct perception, yet they differ as much between direct perceptions as between pictures. So again, direct perception offers no clear model for depictive meaning. These issues are given a very different treatment by Goodman, but his discussion of caricature centres mainly on *representing-as*, as when a person is depicted *as* a pear, or vice versa, and will be considered under the following issue of fiction.

However, the philosopher Stephanie Ross has provided a useful discussion of caricature, in terms strikingly consonant with Goodman's theory.<sup>60</sup> She pointed firstly to the problem of establishing caricature as an exaggeration of distinctive, standard or truthful features of the object. No such features may be reliably identified. They depend upon too many conflicting interests, and kinds of pictures. Yet caricature remains a reliable category, we rarely revise what is and is not a caricature, even if acknowledging a grey area. Indeed, we can often judge a picture to be a caricature without fully identifying the object. She further argued that the practice of caricature does not require necessary and sufficient conditions, that not only can we recognise caricature on the basis of experience with pictures, take and treat them differently from other pictures, but also that our experience in these matters extends to direct perception and - crucially for Goodman's theory - to the

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<sup>59</sup> Wollheim, 1987, p. 71.

<sup>60</sup> Ross, 'Caricature' in *The Monist*, 58, 1974, pp. 284-293.

projection of predicates.<sup>61</sup> Predicates and projection will also be explained under the issue of fiction. In stressing the interdependence of pictures and direct perception in complex projection, Ross effectively denies Wollheim's distinction as well.

Yet Ross's account still leaves the problem of caricatures as pictures that are 'less realistic and which demand we see reality (which includes people *and* pictures) in terms of them'.<sup>62</sup> In other words, there is still the paradox of the unrealistic somehow accepted as realistic. To remedy this we can firstly distinguish caricature from other less realistic pictures, for example note that caricature typically does not just build a novel perspective, such as that of a fisheye lens, nor does it achieve the complexity of a portrait by Picasso or Goya, to use Ross's examples. So caricature is neither in the business of a comprehensive system of depth nor an especially complex version of the object. Rather, *how* it pictures is a matter of mere pastiche and parody, recognisable in itself, as noted. The ridicule is directed as much to the basics of drawing and portraiture as it is to its object, and because it is bound much more closely to norms of depiction it is both more superficial and amusing as well as more dependent upon a standard and familiar object. Thus we have pictures *about* realism, rather than realistic pictures, and objects that easily survive such minor versions. Finally, Ross rightly pointed to the parallels between metaphor and caricature. Not all caricature strictly functions as metaphor, but both 'inhabit a continuum with literal ways of depicting reality' and 'are vehicles for conciseness, novelty and economy of expression'. Differences between strict depictive metaphor, or allegory, and caricature come under greater scrutiny when the study looks to the history of painting in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

#### 4. Fiction

Like caricature, fiction involves the ability to deal in particulars and kinds, individuals and classes. Yet fiction asks a more pointed question of theories of depiction based upon resemblance, since there are no actual or existential objects for pictures of unicorns or Homer Simpson to resemble. Intuitively, one might suppose a resemblance to a kind of horse, with a horn on its forehead, or to a kind of middle-aged man, bald, sallow complexion, five o'clock shadow, pronounced

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<sup>61</sup> Ross, 1974, pp. 284-293.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* p. 291.

exophthalmia, will suffice. But where reference is understood as strictly to actual individual objects, they will not. For Goodman, pictures, like names, obtain predicates, and a nominalist ontology requires fictive pictures be taken firstly to depict or denote no actual or individual object, or as null-denotation.<sup>63</sup> A null-denotation is understood to reverse the direction of its reference, to point to (or place its predicate in) only a sort of picture. A *unicorn-picture* or a *Homer Simpson-picture*, are here the preferred nomenclature, taken as a more accurate indication of reference direction, rather than implying there is an actual object, or a predicate extended beyond the fictive picture.

Null denotation thus directs reference to the way we use or sort pictures, even at the expense of having a further or actual object. Expanding on sorts of pictures is not an idle exercise, as pictures of actual objects must all belong to sorts of pictures, must be an *x*-picture of a *y*-object, and sometimes a *y*-as-*x*-picture. A unicorn-picture or a Homer Simpson-picture go to organising the workings of pictures in the same way as class terms sort pictures of young women as young women-pictures, not that all pictures containing young women need be classed as young women-pictures, or that young women-pictures need contain only young women. Importantly, the sorting of pictures and objects does not in Goodman's view require prior definitions or acquaintance with rules. It proceeds by trial and error, practice and precedent, can learn sort of picture from object or vice versa, and complies with consensus. This urges the parallel with language acquisition, and the commitment to depiction taken as denotation. Yet Goodman's view also aligns fiction with fundamental processes of classification and construal, and fiction duly emerges a more dignified and vital activity.

How is this nominalist view of fiction reconciled within a view of depiction as exemplification?<sup>64</sup> If anything the view of depiction as exemplification makes it clearer that fictive or *null depiction* functions as a form of self-reference, requiring a two-way or resemblance relation. In exchanging null denotation for null depiction, the study exchanges the notion of a null yet converse denotation, for the two-way

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<sup>63</sup> Goodman, 1976, pp. 21-26.

<sup>64</sup> Although Goodman explicitly denies that exemplification may be fictive (Goodman, 1984, p. 60) this is taken here to apply to *material* exemplification, or exemplification of three-dimensional properties, rather than *depictive* exemplification.

reference of exemplification. The proposed theory therefore allows resemblance for fictive pictures, but only to sorts of pictures, through effective sample. Depiction may still be allied to predication. Nominalism is available even in the absence of denotation. However for ease of exposition the study remains Platonist and talk henceforth remains of properties rather than predicates.

## 5. Found Depiction

Natural objects may also exhibit depiction, such as the faces and figures found in stains on a wall, the moon, clouds or foliage. Their occurrence is generally taken as a contributing factor, to a greater or lesser extent, in the discovery or invention of depiction. Wollheim in particular places great emphasis upon them, and upon our natural ability to ‘see-in’ and find such depictions.<sup>65</sup> Gombrich devotes a chapter to their ability to provide suggestive ‘schemas’, which our projections can ‘correct’, and in this way serve as a source of inspiration for artists.<sup>66</sup> Neither view is disputed here; rather the opportunity is taken to point to something more these objects share with the perception of two dimensions.

It is an obvious but overlooked quality, and it is not always associated with a surface. It may arise amongst disparate objects seen in silhouette, or in a space between the shapes of clouds. What occurs is the perception of a certain irregularity and complexity of structure that taxes expectations or familiarity with certain objects or spaces. We are caught up in unexpected detail, and look for a simpler way of organising it. We see faces and figures because we have the most elaborate and elastic constructs for these objects, and they are equally mobile or organic objects as a result. They are wilfully misapplied in such depiction, as an experiment in obtaining a simpler or more familiar configuration. They need not be illusions. That depends how wilfully they are misapplied. It is unlikely, or extremely difficult to find a depiction of a microwave or a lawnmower for example, in stains or clouds, because our perceptions of these objects lack the elasticity to accommodate enough variation, and equally difficult to find such depictions in the plain perception of complex but regular objects such as an air conditioning grill or bookshelf.

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<sup>65</sup> Wollheim, 1987, pp. 48-51.

<sup>66</sup> Gombrich, 1960, pp. 154-169.

In explaining how a surface must exemplify two dimensions in order to function as depiction, the need to ensure that the markings on the surface stand out, or alert us to their special quality as a surface, has been noted. In fact they function in much the same way as the examples drawn from nature, in foiling perception of the picture surface, as other than exemplifying two dimensions. In nature we find depictions when we cannot find enough that is predictable and simple in our perceptions, and in culture we find depictions when we learn how to reorganise surfaces, in special ways.

### Conclusion

The proposed theory of depiction now stands consolidated by engagement with five key issues. The theory takes depth as variously constructed by schemes of projection and perspective, in projection by angle contrasted with axes of picture plane, in perspective by angles determined by nominated horizon and vanishing points. It ranges schemes according to integration of object with picture plane, to behind or beyond it. Expanding on schemes amounts to expanding on sorts of objects depicted and presents opportunities for caricature and fiction. Caricature is taken as in Gombrich and Wollheim, to be a testing of objects and pictures, and as in Ross, to be a practice that requires neither ready recognition nor resemblance for the object, nor fixed features to a scheme or style. Caricature is also interesting because it prompts the issue of expression, and with it draws depiction toward a theory of art. Similarly, fiction is taken as a further means of construction for schemes of picture and object, and available to Goodman's nominalist ontology, by null-depiction, rather than null-denotation. The issues of distortion and found depiction here allow us to distinguish between optic conditions and favoured or available schemes for depiction, their accidental occurrence and frail conformity. Having established this broader foundation for the proposed theory, it now turns to five further issues, in expression and style (together), art and its history (together) interpretation, realism and painting.